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Section 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), codified at 42 USC § 3604(c),
prohibits advertisements that “indicate[ ] any preference” on the basis of race,
national origin, and other protected categories. The text of the FHA, however, is
ambiguous regarding its applicability to the language in which housing advertisements appear, raising the specter of potential liability in communities where residents speak and write in multiple languages. Using Chicago’s Chinatown as a case
study, this Comment examines whether the exclusive use of Chinese-language advertisements for housing in Chinatown violates § 3604(c). I begin by enumerating a
series of factors that courts should consider: (1) the demographics of the relevant
community, (2) the identities and language capabilities of the parties, (3) how an
“ordinary reader” in the relevant community would perceive the advertisement, and
(4) translation costs. The goal of this approach is to strike a workable balance between minority-language advertisements’ inclusive effect with respect to immigrant
landlords and prospective residents, while acknowledging Congress’s intent to combat exclusionary housing messages.
Furthermore, I argue that even if such advertisements technically run afoul of
§ 3604(c), courts should interpret the FHA as a legislative scheme that protects minority communities’ housing rights, rather than uncritically mandating integration
and assimilation. Minority-language communities generate network effects by bringing together speakers and readers of a common language. To avoid unnecessarily
jettisoning these benefits, courts should construe § 3604(c) to permit advertisements
that convey the existence of a language community. Such advertisements signal that
individuals who may be unwelcome elsewhere are welcomed in the community, but
they do not necessarily “indicate” that nonspeakers and nonreaders are unwelcome.
Thus, courts should hesitate before enforcing § 3604(c) against Chinese landlords
and newspapers absent extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent.
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INTRODUCTION
Apartment listings in Chicago’s Chinatown neighborhood are
notoriously difficult to find.1 Geographic searches on apartment
rental websites yield a curious absence of hits where the neighborhood, concentrated at the intersection of Cermak Road and
Wentworth Avenue on the city’s near southwest side, should be.
A recent local news investigation revealed that “most Chinatown
apartments are rented to Chinese tenants through exclusively
Chinese networks.”2 As a result, prospective tenants must find
apartments via Chinese-language newspapers, Chinese-language

1
Monica Eng, Why Chicago’s Chinatown Is Practically Invisible on Apartment
Rental Sites (WBEZ, Oct 29, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/DMD2-7VNV.
2
Id.
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signs around the neighborhood, Chinese social media websites, or
word of mouth. Off the record, some Chinese landlords have admitted that they prefer to rent to Chinese tenants, citing cultural
familiarity and a shared understanding that tenants are responsible for their own maintenance needs.3
This departure from typical advertising practices raises the
question: Does the exclusive use of Chinese-language advertisements for housing in Chinatown violate the Fair Housing
Act4 (FHA)? Professor Allison Bethel says the practice might not
violate the letter of the law, “[b]ut it definitely violates the spirit
of the law, which, after all, is to foster more open communities.”5
On the one hand, such advertisements may send an implicit message of exclusion, suggesting that non-Chinese residents are not
welcome.6 On the other hand, Chinese-language advertisements
also send a message of inclusion to recent immigrants and
Chinese Americans who communicate primarily or exclusively in
Chinese.7
Pondering the legality of minority-language housing advertisements is not merely an academic exercise. As the United
States transitions from a majority-white nation to a majorityminority nation,8 judges will undoubtedly confront difficult questions arising from the interaction of diverse populations.9 The
United States looks (and sounds) very different than it did several

3

Id.
Pub L No 90-284, 82 Stat 81 (1968), codified as amended at 42 USC § 3601 et seq.
5
Eng, Why Chicago’s Chinatown Is Practically Invisible (cited in note 1).
6
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude,
104 Mich L Rev 1835, 1854–55 (2006) (discussing the ways in which residential advertising can communicate “exclusionary vibes”).
7
Some real estate developers explicitly cater to residents who want to live in a community centered around a common heritage. See, for example, Dennis Rodkin, Retirement
Community Focuses on Indian-Americans (Crain’s Chicago Business, Oct 18, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/72XG-Y8GA.
8
See Older People Projected to Outnumber Children for First Time in U.S. History
(US Census Bureau, Mar 13, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/8F66-SSW6 (“By 2020,
less than half of children in the United States are projected to be non-Hispanic white
alone.”); William H. Frey, The US Will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045, Census Projects
(Brookings, Mar 14, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/898A-JJMD.
9
For an example in the employment discrimination context, see generally EEOC v
Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d 233 (7th Cir 1993) (addressing whether a small business’s use of word-of-mouth hiring, which resulted in an overwhelmingly Korean workforce,
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). For an example in the housing discrimination context, see Reyes v Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd Partnership, 903 F3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir
2018) (concluding that Latino residents of a mobile home park stated a prima facie case of
national origin discrimination because the landlord’s policy requiring proof of documentation
had a disparate impact on Latinos), cert denied, 139 S Ct 2026 (2019).
4
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decades ago.10 To take one example, between 2000 and 2010, the
Asian population in the United States grew four times faster than
the total US population—outpacing any other racial group.11
Accordingly, Chicago’s Chinatown provides a practical case study
for examining how the FHA should apply in minority-language
communities.
Passed in 1968, the FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”
in the sale or rental of a dwelling.12 Section 3604(c) also makes it
illegal to
make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to
the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.13
Subsequent court decisions have clarified that the FHA imposes
liability not only on landlords, but also on newspapers and other
media that publish discriminatory housing advertisements.14
As of this writing, I am unaware of any cases in which prospective tenants or homeowners have sought to impose liability
on Chinese landlords or publishers under § 3604(c). In fact, there
is scant case law addressing the broader issue of whether and

10 See, for example, Camille Ryan, Language Use in the United States: 2011 *7 (US
Census Bureau, Aug 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/B6ZH-TAMY (noting that from
1980 to 2010, the use of languages other than English at home increased by 158.2 percent).
11 Elizabeth M. Hoeffel, et al, The Asian Population: 2010 *3–4 (US Census Bureau,
Mar 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/NDZ6-J3KH.
12 FHA § 804(a), (b), 82 Stat at 83, codified at 42 USC § 3604(a), (b).
13 FHA § 804(c), 82 Stat at 83, codified at 42 USC § 3604(c) (emphases added).
14 See United States v Hunter, 459 F2d 205, 210–15 (4th Cir 1972) (holding that
application of § 3604(c) to newspapers does not violate the First Amendment). See also
Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at
the Fair Housing Act’s Most Intriguing Provision, 29 Fordham Urban L J 187, 214 (2001).
There has been litigation attempting to hold websites like Craigslist liable for discriminatory housing advertisements. See, for example, Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, Inc v Craigslist, Inc, 519 F3d 666, 668–72 (7th Cir 2008). In that case,
Craigslist managed to escape liability thanks to the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
which states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.” 47 USC § 230(c)(1).
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when the language of a housing advertisement constitutes discrimination on the basis of national origin.15 Given that the statute and its accompanying regulations16 are silent as to whether
notices, statements, or advertisements must appear in a particular language, several possible conclusions regarding the legality
of Chinese-language advertisements come to mind.
First, the exclusive use of Chinese-language advertisements
may be a clear violation of the FHA because language is correlated with national origin, and advertisements in Chinese therefore “indicate[ ] a[ ] preference” for people of Chinese origin.17 This
approach is analogous to the so-called human-models cases, in
which the exclusive use of white models in housing advertisements was sometimes found to violate § 3604(c).18
Second, even if these advertisements technically violate the
FHA, courts may hesitate before imposing liability in light of the
historical discrimination that pushed Chinese immigrants into
ethnic enclaves in the first place.19 The overarching legislative
purpose of the FHA was to combat racial segregation in housing—
particularly, discrimination against African Americans—not to
penalize residents of ethnic enclaves for advertising in their native language.20 Thus, a court might disregard the plain meaning
of § 3604(c) as applied to Chinese landlords and publishers.21

15 One unreported case addressed the possibility that Spanish-language advertisements might indicate a discriminatory preference for Hispanics. See Guevara v UMH
Properties, Inc, 2014 WL 5488918, *6 (WD Tenn) (concluding that “[p]laintiffs’ allegation
that Defendant only advertised in Spanish language media outlets is sufficient to state a
claim because it . . . denies non-Spanish speaking segments of the housing market, who
are overwhelmingly non-Hispanic, information about housing opportunities”), citing 24
CFR § 100.75.
16 See 24 CFR § 100.75.
17 42 USC § 3604(c). For a proponent of this view, see R. Ian Forrest, Note, Kàn Bú
Tài Dǒng: The Fair Housing Act, Language Discrimination, and Chinese Classifieds, 101
Ky L J 839, 858–59 (2013). But see note 174 (critiquing the assumption that language is
correlated with national origin).
18 See Part II.C.3.
19 On the rise of Chinatowns as a response to racism and exclusion, see generally
Sucheng Chan, ed, Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882–
1943 (Temple 1991); Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California
(Illinois 1973). Of course, the formation of ethnic enclaves was not due entirely to exclusion;
recent immigrants also sought out these communities because of family connections and
cultural familiarity. See notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
20 See notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
21 The classic prototype of this argument is Holy Trinity Church v United States, 143
US 457, 459 (1892) (“[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”). This
purposivist approach to statutory interpretation has fallen out of favor due to the growing
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Finally, such advertisements may not violate the FHA at all,
unless the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, such as
African Americans or Hispanics. While this asymmetrical approach22 has some normative appeal, it is not a promising option
under current law, which makes clear that anyone with standing
may bring an FHA claim.23
This Comment makes two significant contributions to the
nascent literature on minority-language housing advertisements.
First, I identify a series of factors that courts should consider
when faced with such advertisements, including: (1) the demographics of the relevant community, (2) the national origin and
language abilities of the landlord and prospective renter or buyer,
(3) whether an “ordinary reader”24 would consider the advertisement to indicate a preference on the basis of national origin,
and (4) translation costs. The goal of this approach is to strike a

influence of textualism. See, for example, Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum L Rev 1, 29–30, 36 (2006) (noting that “few judges or scholars today
espouse the strong purposivism that textualists set out to discredit two decades ago,” but
arguing that the two schools of thought are actually converging). But see Zuni Public
School District No 89 v Department of Education, 550 US 81, 108 (2007) (Scalia dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for declining to apply the plain meaning of a federal labor statute:
“[T]oday Church of the Holy Trinity arises, Phoenix-like, from the ashes.”).
See also Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44 Wm & Mary
L Rev 1521, 1534 (2003) (arguing that private communities’ use of “ethnically-conscious
preferential practices . . . should, for the most part, be allowed to exist within the ‘pale’
twilight of the law”).
22 See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law, 2017
Wis L Rev 69, 73 (describing the asymmetrical approach as “oppos[ing] only those uses of
a protected trait that harm the disadvantaged group, and thus favor[ing] an asymmetrical
ban that would allow only members of the disadvantaged group to utilize the law”). See
also Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 BC L Rev 1085, 1123–29 (2017)
(arguing that asymmetrical approaches to discrimination law may be appropriate in some
situations).
23 See, for example, Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 409 US 205, 212
(1972) (holding that a white tenant had standing to sue a landlord for discrimination
against nonwhites); Mayers v Ridley, 465 F2d 630, 640–41 (DC Cir 1972) (en banc) (recognizing that white home sellers were harmed by racially restrictive covenants recorded on
their property deeds); Guevara, 2014 WL 5488918 at *5–6 (concluding that Hispanic plaintiffs stated a claim for a violation of § 3604(c) when their landlord advertised extensively
in Spanish-language print and radio, thereby allegedly “depriving them of the benefits of
a racially and culturally diverse environment”). See also Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L
J at 216–19 (cited in note 14).
Similarly, in employment discrimination law, courts have made clear that protection
from race and sex discrimination is symmetrical under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. See McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co, 427 US 273, 280, 286–87 (1976)
(race); Martinez v El Paso County, 710 F2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir 1983) (sex).
24 The “ordinary reader” standard was first introduced in Hunter, 459 F2d at 215.
See Part II.A.3.

2020]

Exclusionary Advertising

229

workable balance between minority-language advertisements’ inclusive effect with respect to Chinese landlords and prospective
residents, for example, while acknowledging Congress’s intent to
combat exclusionary housing messages by passing § 3604(c).
Going further, this Comment draws on antisubordination
theory25 to argue that courts should interpret the FHA as a legislative scheme that protects minority communities’ housing rights,
rather than uncritically mandating integration and assimilation.26 Minority-language communities generate network effects
by bringing together speakers and readers of a common language.27 To avoid unnecessarily jettisoning these benefits, courts
should construe § 3604(c) to permit advertisements that convey
the existence of a language community.28 Such advertisements
signal that individuals who may be unwelcome elsewhere are welcome in the community, but do not necessarily “indicate[ ]” that
nonspeakers and nonreaders are unwelcome.29
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I provides essential
background on Chinatowns and the FHA. Part II deconstructs the
provisions of § 3604(c), noting the lack of clear guidance from the
applicable regulations and case law. Finally, Part III proposes
factors that a court should consider when faced with a minoritylanguage advertisement, and argues that the FHA should be interpreted to reflect antisubordination goals more generally.

25 On the antisubordination principle, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 Phil & Pub Affairs 107, 157 (1976) (arguing that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits laws or official practices that “aggravate[ ] . . . the subordinate position
of a specially disadvantaged group”).
26 For more on antisubordination theory, see Part II.D.
27 See Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 Cal L Rev 479, 483 (1998) (“[A] network effect exists where purchasers find a good more valuable as additional purchasers buy the same good.”). For example,
a single telephone has no communicative utility on its own but becomes more valuable as
other consumers purchase telephones. Id at 488–89. Similarly, language has “negligible
inherent value to the first speaker and increasing value over the range of additional
speakers.” Id at 489. See also Brant T. Lee, The Network Economic Effects of Whiteness,
53 Am U L Rev 1259, 1269 (2004) (observing that network analysis has implications beyond economics).
28 By contrast, housing advertisements featuring exclusively white models send a
message of racial preference without a plausible nondiscriminatory justification, and
therefore present a stronger case for § 3604(c) liability. See Part II.C.3.
29 42 USC § 3604(c).
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I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
This Part begins with a brief overview of the history of
American Chinatowns and Chicago’s Chinatown in particular. Notably, Chicago’s Chinatown is one of the only Chinatowns in the
United States that is still growing.30 The neighborhood is situated
in close proximity with other minority neighborhoods, such as
Bronzeville and Pilsen, which are predominantly African American and Hispanic, respectively.31 As such, Chicago’s Chinatown
provides a valuable case study for potential litigation concerning
minority-language advertisements. Part I.B discusses the passage of the FHA, the legislative history of § 3604(c), and how the
FHA is enforced.
A. Chinatowns
Chinatowns first emerged on the West Coast in the midnineteenth century, when many Chinese immigrants came to the
United States in search of work opportunities as railroad laborers
and miners.32 In the face of discrimination, harassment, and violence, Chinese immigrants sought refuge in ethnic enclaves.33

30 Anna Clark, The Unlikely Boom of Chicago’s Chinatown (Next City, Feb 22, 2016),
archived at https://perma.cc/GT7Y-JS8G. By contrast, New York and San Francisco’s
Chinatowns are shrinking. See Bonnie Tsui, The End of Chinatown (The Atlantic, Dec
2011), archived at https://perma.cc/NDT7-9BVM. On the problem of gentrification in east
coast Chinatowns, see Bethany Y. Li, et al, Chinatown Then and Now: Gentrification in
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia (Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund,
2013), archived at https://perma.cc/BG7Z-TF8Q.
31 For a map of Chicago’s nine districts and seventy-seven community areas, see
Chicago Neighborhoods (The Chicago 77, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/UPH2-7WA3.
For brief descriptions of the cultural and ethnic identities of these neighborhoods, see
Explore Chicago’s 77 Neighborhoods (Choose Chicago, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/
6S3G-FG93.
32 Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California at 12–15, 24 (cited in note
19); Huping Ling, Chinese Chicago: Race, Transnational Migration, and Community Since
1870 29–30 (Stanford 2012). For an excellent transnational history of Chinese migration
to and from the United States, see generally Madeline Yuan-yin Hsu, Dreaming of Gold,
Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration Between the United States and South
China, 1882–1943 (Stanford 2000).
33 See L. Eve Armentrout Ma, Chinatown Organizations and the Anti-Chinese Movement, 1882–1914, in Chan, ed, Entry Denied 147, 160–66 (cited in note 19). Professor Eve
Ma notes that American Chinatowns were products of a much larger phenomenon of “overseas Chinese,” who formed similar communities in Southeast Asia, Canada, and Latin
America. Id at 160–61. Hence, the profusion of Chinese self-help organizations “[cannot]
be attributed solely to an attempt by Chinese in the United States to protect themselves
from the racism of non-Chinese Americans.” Id at 162 (emphasis added).
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Chinatowns provided vital social services and community networks otherwise unavailable to immigrants,34 particularly after
the Chinese Exclusion Act35 erected legal barriers to citizenship.36
At the same time, Chinese immigrants often had nowhere else to
go due to intense housing and labor discrimination.37
The first Chinese immigrants came to Chicago from
California in the 1870s.38 Chicago’s Chinatown was originally
located in the Loop on Clark Street between Van Buren and
Harrison Streets.39 In the 1910s, rising rents drove Chinese residents and businesses out of the Loop to the Near South Side. The
construction of the Dan Ryan and Stevenson highways in the
1950s cut the new “South Chinatown” in half and led to a severe
housing shortage, but the community recovered and eventually
outgrew its previous boundaries.40 Today, the neighborhood is
concentrated at the intersection of Cermak Road and Wentworth
Avenue.41 Chinatown’s population increased by 26 percent between 2000 and 2010,42 and many Chinese immigrants now reside
in nearby Bridgeport and McKinley Park.43
Chinatown’s expansion into other neighborhoods has not
been without tension. In the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese American
developers began building townhomes in Bridgeport that were
34 Id at 147 (“Chinese exclusion in particular, and the anti-Chinese movement in
general, forced [Chinatown] social organizations to come to terms with organized, institutionalized opposition to the very presence of Chinese.”).
35 Pub L No 47-126, 22 Stat 58 (1882). In addition to prohibiting the immigration of
new Chinese laborers, the Act barred Chinese immigrants who were already working in
the United States from obtaining citizenship. Id at 61. See also Mae M. Ngai, Impossible
Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America 64 (Princeton 2004).
36 Chinese immigrants were not passive in the face of exclusion. See Charles J.
McClain and Laurene Wu McClain, The Chinese Contribution to the Development of
American Law, in Chan, Entry Denied 3, 21 (cited in note 19) (arguing that Chinese litigants during the exclusion era made significant contributions to due process and equal
protection jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment).
37 See Braden Goyette, How Racism Created America’s Chinatowns (Huffington
Post, Dec 6, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/F2PC-T2MG. On the transformation of
stereotypes about Asian Americans from the “yellow peril” to the “model minority,” see
generally Ellen D. Wu, The Color of Success: Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model
Minority (Princeton 2013).
38 Ling, Chinese Chicago at 30–32 (cited in note 32).
39 Id at 32, 52 (providing an illustration).
40 Id at 216–17.
41 Id at 53, 218–20. See also Clark, The Unlikely Boom of Chicago’s Chinatown (cited
in note 30).
42 Clark, The Unlikely Boom of Chicago’s Chinatown (cited in note 30).
43 Eng, Why Chicago’s Chinatown Is Practically Invisible (cited in note 1). On the
rising Chinese population in Bridgeport, see Ling, Chinese Chicago at 220–22 (cited in
note 32).
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marketed specifically toward Chinese immigrants and Chinese
Americans.44 White residents have sometimes responded to the
growing Chinese population with violence, including assaults on
Chinese American teenagers and an arson attack on a Chinese
restaurant in Bridgeport.45
At the very least, demographic shifts on Chicago’s south side
will increase the likelihood that people who cannot read or speak
Chinese will encounter advertisements that they do not understand. Non-Chinese prospective residents may turn to the FHA
as a tool to challenge the exclusive use of Chinese-language housing advertisements. The next Section provides historical context
for the FHA’s passage and explains how it is enforced.
B. The Fair Housing Act
The FHA followed a series of landmark civil rights achievements, including the 1964 Civil Rights Act46 and the 1965 Voting
Rights Act.47 Congress had been considering fair housing legislation since 1966,48 but it was not until 1968, in the wake of Dr.
Martin Luther King’s assassination and the release of the Kerner
Commission Report,49 that Congress ultimately passed the FHA.50
The legislative history indicates that promoting racial integration
in housing was a major goal of the FHA.51 As enacted, the FHA

44

Ling, Chinese Chicago at 221 (cited in note 32).
Id at 221–22. See also Jenny J. Chen, First-Ever Tracker of Hate Crimes Against
Asian-Americans Launched (NPR, Feb 17, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/Y9BQ
-ELHT (observing that “national statistics on hate crimes against [Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders] are still scanty,” but reporting growing concern in recent years).
46 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000a et seq.
47 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10101 et seq.
48 See Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 197–98 & n 34 (cited in note 14), citing
Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress Proposing Further Legislation to
Strengthen Civil Rights, 1966 Pub Papers 461, 467–69.
49 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders *1 (1968), archived at https://perma.cc/XDP3-UK8M.
The Report painted a grim portrait of an increasingly segregated nation, warning that the
United States was “moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and
unequal.”
50 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 194 (cited in note 14). See also Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project, Inc,
135 S Ct 2507, 2516 (2015) (“Congress responded [to the assassination of Dr. King] by
adopting the Kerner Commission’s recommendation and passing the Fair Housing Act.”).
51 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 212–13 (cited in note 14).
45
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prohibited housing discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, and religion, but subsequent amendments added
sex, disability, and familial status as protected categories.52
Section 3608(d) of the FHA contains a cryptic instruction that
“[a]ll executive departments and agencies shall administer their
programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of this
title.”53 The provision applies to state and local governments that
receive federal grants and to public housing agencies.54 The
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) codified
its regulatory interpretation of this “affirmatively furthering fair
housing” (AFFH) requirement in 2015,55 but the Department announced in 2018 that it is in the process of amending the rule.56
Although the future of AFFH is uncertain, the rule underscores
the FHA’s goal of achieving more integrated communities.
1. Legislative history of § 3604(c).
As Part II will show, the text of § 3604(c) is ambiguous regarding its application to minority-language advertisements.
When the text of a statute is unclear, it is appropriate to turn to
the legislative history for guidance.57 Yet the legislative history of

52 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-383, § 808, 88
Stat 633, 728; Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-430 § 800, 102 Stat
1619, 1619–20.
53 FHA § 808(d), 82 Stat at 84–85, codified at 42 USC § 3608(d) (emphasis added).
54 24 CFR §§ 5.152, 5.154(b).
55 See Department of Housing and Urban Development, Affirmatively Furthering
Fair Housing, 80 Fed Reg 42272, 42272–73 (2015), amending 24 CFR Parts 5, 91, 92, 570,
574, 576, 903.
56 See HUD to Revise Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule (National Law
Review, Aug 14, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YJ4J-JM7L; Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Streamlining and
Enhancements, 83 Fed Reg 40713 (2018), amending 24 CFR Parts 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576,
903 (inviting public comment on amendments to the AFFH rule).
As currently written, 24 CFR § 5.150 requires HUD grant recipients to “[take] meaningful actions to overcome historic patterns of segregation, promote fair housing choice,
and foster inclusive communities that are free from discrimination.” Specifically, 24 CFR
§ 5.152 defines “affirmatively furthering fair housing” in part as “replacing segregated living patterns with truly integrated and balanced living patterns” and “transforming racially and ethnically concentrated areas of poverty into areas of opportunity.” As of this
writing, HUD has suspended assessments of fair housing submissions.
57 See, for example, Exxon Mobil Corp v Allapattah Services, Inc, 545 US 546, 568
(2005) (“[T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or
any other extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation
only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding
of otherwise ambiguous terms.”).
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§ 3604(c) is sparse,58 more so than the rest of the FHA.59 At least
one senator expressed concern that the section might violate the
First Amendment right of free speech,60 but the section otherwise
generated little debate.61 As a result, Professor Robert Schwemm
observes that “the meaning of this provision must be derived almost exclusively from the words of the statute, unaided by additional materials.”62 Indeed, when the Supreme Court was first
tasked with interpreting the FHA, the Court agreed that “[t]he
legislative history of the Act is not too helpful.”63 Nonetheless,
Schwemm argues that “there is a good deal of evidence [Congress]
was aware of the implications of the broad language it chose to use
and intended this language to have its full and natural meaning.”64
In the absence of much legislative history, some commentators have turned to contemporaneous antidiscrimination laws.65
Specifically, § 3604(c)’s language closely parallels that of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act,66 which prohibits employment discrimination “because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”67
Section 3604(c) differs from Title VII, however, in that it does not
require proof of either intentional discrimination or disparate impact.68 Rather, a notice, statement, or advertisement need only
“indicate” a discriminatory preference to an “ordinary reader” or

58 See Mayers, 465 F2d at 633 (“Although the legislative history of this section is
sparse, it indicates beyond doubt that, as the words themselves suggest, Congress intended to go beyond advertising to reach other sorts of ‘notices’ and ‘statements’ as well.”).
59 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 197–200 (cited in note 14). For more on the
legislative history of the FHA, see id at 194 n 15 (collecting citations).
60 Civil Rights Act of 1967, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S 1026, S 1318, S 1359, S 1362,
S 1462, HR 2516 and HR 10805 (Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967), 90th Cong 127 (1967)
(statement of Sen Ervin) (opposing the bill because “[f]reedom of speech includes the right
to express a preference”).
61 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 199 (cited in note 14).
62 Id.
63 Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 409 US 205, 210 (1972).
64 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 211 (cited in note 14).
65 See, for example, id at 206 (observing that “many of the substantive provisions of
the [Johnson] Administration’s [original] fair housing proposal, including its prohibition
against discriminatory ads, notices, and statements, closely track the language adopted in
Title VII”); Forrest, Note, 101 Ky L J at 841 (cited in note 17) (“The lack of clarity in the
legislative history has required frequent reference to sister statutes like Title VII, whose
debates are, at times, much more voluminous and instructive.”), citing Trafficante, 409
US at 205.
66 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 206–07 & nn 78–79 (cited in note 14).
67 42 USC § 2000e-2.
68 See Inclusive Communities, 135 S Ct at 2516–17 (noting that the Court has long
recognized disparate-impact claims under Title VII).
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“ordinary listener.”69 In this way, § 3604(c) operates as a form of
strict liability, such that intent to discriminate is not required.70
However, evidence of discriminatory intent may weigh in favor
of finding that an advertisement indicates a discriminatory
preference.71
2. Enforcement.
The FHA permits both government and private enforcement.72 HUD has primary responsibility for interpreting, administering, and enforcing the FHA. Under § 3610, HUD receives
complaints from “aggrieved person[s],”73 or HUD may file its own
complaint.74 After receiving a complaint, HUD will prepare an investigative report and attempt to reach a conciliation agreement.75 HUD may then refer the matter to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for enforcement.76 HUD may also refer the matter
to state or local housing authorities.77
In some cases, the Attorney General will also commence a
civil action.78 Such an action is appropriate
[w]henever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to
believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a
pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any
of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of
persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this

69

Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 223 (cited in note 14).
See id at 308 (“[Section] 3604(c) may be violated without intent to discriminate.”).
See also Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination: Law & Litigation § 15:1 (Thomson
Reuters 2014).
71 See, for example, Jancik v Department of Housing and Urban Development, 44 F3d
553, 556 (7th Cir 1995) (“[E]vidence of such [discriminatory] intent is not irrelevant. Evidence that the author or speaker intended his or her words to indicate a prohibited preference obviously bears on the question of whether the words in fact do so.”).
72 But see Trafficante, 409 US at 211 (noting that because “the enormity of the task
of assuring fair housing makes the role of the Attorney General . . . minimal, the main
generating force must be private suits”).
73 42 USC § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i). See also 42 USC § 3602(i)(1)–(2) (defining an “aggrieved
person” as any person who “claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice” or “believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that
is about to occur”).
74 For more on the complaint process, which is overseen by the Office of Fair Housing
and Equal Opportunity (FHEO), see Learn About the FHEO Complaint and Investigation
Process (HUD), archived at https://perma.cc/34YU-L7YG.
75 42 USC § 3610(b).
76 42 USC § 3610(c), (e).
77 42 USC § 3610(f).
78 42 USC § 3614.
70
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subchapter and such denial raises an issue of general public
importance.79
Alternatively, the Attorney General may take a case upon referral
from the HUD Secretary.80
HUD and DOJ do not bring the vast majority of fair housing
claims. According to the National Fair Housing Alliance, HUD
processed just 4.5 percent of all housing discrimination complaints in 2017, while DOJ handled a paltry 0.01 percent.81 By
contrast, nonprofit fair housing organizations handled 71.3 percent of complaints, and state and local agencies funded by the federal Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) processed approximately 23.9 percent.82 Very few complaints proceed to litigation.
In 2017, HUD charged only nineteen cases and DOJ’s Housing
and Civil Enforcement Section brought just forty-one cases, of
which twenty-four were pattern or practice cases.83
Individuals also have a private right of action in state or federal court.84 Plaintiffs may seek preventive relief,85 monetary
damages,86 civil penalties,87 and attorneys’ fees (to a prevailing
party other than the US government).88 Standing is very broad.
In Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co,89 two white
tenants sued their landlord, alleging that they had “lost the social
benefits of living in an integrated community,” “missed business
and professional advantages,” and were “stigmatized as residents
of a white ghetto.”90 Concluding that the plaintiffs had standing,
the Supreme Court interpreted “aggrieved persons” using “a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same

79

42 USC § 3614(a) (emphasis added).
See 42 USC § 3610(c), (e), or (g).
81 Shanti Abedin, et al, Making Every Neighborhood a Place of Opportunity: 2018
Fair Housing Trends Report *49 (National Fair Housing Alliance, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/P2H3-MQZL.
82 Id.
83 Id at *56, 59. I have not been able to locate specific data on how many of those
cases involved § 3604(c) claims.
84 42 USC § 3612(a), (o). Alternatively, aggrieved persons are entitled to a hearing
before an administrative law judge. 42 USC § 3612(b).
85 42 USC § 3614(d)(1)(A).
86 42 USC § 3614(d)(1)(B).
87 42 USC § 3614(d)(1)(C).
88 42 USC § 3614(d)(2).
89 409 US 205 (1972).
90 Id at 208 (quotation marks omitted).
80
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housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the statute.”91
Later, in Havens Realty Corp v Coleman,92 the Court held that
standing under the FHA extends to the full limits of Article III.93
In that case, one of the plaintiffs was a nonprofit organization that
sought damages for resources spent counteracting the defendants’
alleged racial steering practices.94 The Court concluded that the resulting “drain on the organization’s resources” was a “concrete and
demonstrable injury” sufficient to confer standing.95 This line of
cases indicates that “it is well established that a minority home
seeker subjected to a § 3604(c) violative statement by a housing
provider is entitled to sue the provider for the psychic injuries
caused by that statement.”96
***
This Part has provided historical context for thinking about
how the FHA should apply in minority-language communities in
general and Chicago’s Chinatown in particular. As Part I.B explained, the legislative history does not provide much for courts
to go on, and § 3604(c) claims are most likely to come from private
plaintiffs rather than government agencies. These considerations
set the stage for a closer examination of § 3604(c) itself.
II. BREAKING DOWN § 3604(c)
In order to understand this Comment’s novel interpretation
of the FHA as applied to minority-language advertisements, this
Part unpacks the statutory provision at issue. First, Part II.A sets
91

Id at 210, 212.
455 US 363 (1982).
93 Id at 372–73. Standing derives from Article III, § 1 of the Constitution, which
states that federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction over “Cases” and “Controversies.”
See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 559–61 (1992) (outlining the three
minimum requirements for constitutional standing: injury in fact, traceability, and
redressability).
94 Havens Realty, 455 US at 368–69.
95 Id at 379. See also Spann v Colonial Village, Inc, 899 F2d 24, 27–31 (DC Cir 1990)
(holding that an equal housing nonprofit had standing to sue under § 3604(c) in a case
alleging that racially discriminatory advertisements imposed burdens on the nonprofit’s
limited resources), citing Havens, 455 US at 379.
96 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 302 (cited in note 14). But see Bank of
America Corp v City of Miami, 137 S Ct 1296, 1304–05 (2017) (holding that the city had
standing to sue on the basis of lost tax revenue and added municipal expenses because
those harms fell within the FHA’s “zone of interests,” but declining to revisit the broad
view of standing articulated in Trafficante and Havens).
92
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out the elements of a § 3604(c) claim. Part II.B then demonstrates
the lack of clear regulatory guidance. Given the dearth of cases
addressing the language in which a housing advertisement
appears, Part II.C highlights potentially analogous lines of FHA
cases, including national origin discrimination, racial steering,
and human models. Finally, Part II.D discusses theoretical considerations informing my proposed solution in Part III.
A. Elements of a § 3604(c) Claim
There are three basic elements of a § 3604(c) claim.97 First,
the defendant must have “ma[de], print[ed], or publish[ed], or
cause[d] to be made, printed, or published” a “notice, statement,
or advertisement.”98 Second, the statement must have been made
“with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.”99 Liability does
not result if a landlord simply expressed opposition to the FHA in
general or made a “stray” racial remark.100 Finally, the statement
must “indicate[ ] a[ ] preference, limitation, or discrimination”
based on a protected category or “an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination.”101
The remainder of this Section highlights several key points
in § 3604(c) case law: (1) the provision applies to both landlords
and publishers of discriminatory statements, (2) discriminatory
intent is not necessary, and (3) the “ordinary reader” standard
allows a court to determine whether an advertisement or series
of advertisements violates the statute. These principles are essential for determining whether a minority-language advertisement
violates the FHA.

97 See Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 213–16 (cited in note 14). Schwemm
identifies four elements of a claim, but the second and third elements may be combined.
Id at 214.
98 42 USC § 3604(c). This Comment focuses primarily on advertisements, but statements may also include oral statements, typically by a landlord or her agent to a prospective tenant. See Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 214–15 (cited in note 14). See also
24 CFR § 100.75(b) (“The prohibitions in [§ 3604(c)] shall apply to all written or oral notices or statements by a person engaged in the sale or rental of a dwelling.”).
99 42 USC § 3604(c).
100 See, for example, Harris v Itzhaki, 183 F3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir 1999) (noting that
if a landlord’s discriminatory statement is merely a “stray” remark “unrelated to the decisional process [and therefore] insufficient to show discrimination,” then the landlord is not
liable). See also Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 215 & n 119 (cited in note 14).
101 42 USC § 3604(c).
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1. Applicability to landlords and publishers.
Courts were initially uncertain whether § 3604(c) imposed
liability only on landlords, or if newspapers that published
housing advertisements could also be liable. In one of the first
cases to address this ambiguity, United States v Hunter,102 the US
Attorney General sought to enjoin a local newspaper’s publication
of an advertisement for a basement apartment in a “white
home.”103 The Fourth Circuit held that “both landlords and newspapers are within the section’s reach” based on the plain meaning
of the statute, and that the advertisement clearly indicated a racial preference.104 In addition, the court concluded that § 3604(c)
did not contravene the First Amendment because Congress may
regulate commercial advertising.105 Finally, the court found no
due process violation, in part because there is no “Mrs. Murphy”
exception to § 3604(c).106 Sections 3604(a) and (b) of the FHA allow private, small-scale landlords (like the apocryphal Mrs.
Murphy) to discriminate in who they sell or rent to, but § 3604(c)
does not contain such an exemption.107 This distinction means
that Chinese landlords who could otherwise escape liability under
§ 3604(a) and (b) may face liability under § 3604(c) for the exclusive use of Chinese-language advertisements.
2. Discriminatory intent is not necessary.
Unlike other substantive provisions of the FHA, which require a showing of discriminatory intent or disparate impact,108
§ 3604(c) establishes liability if an advertisement “indicates” that

102

459 F2d 205 (4th Cir 1972).
Id at 209.
104 Id at 210, 215.
105 Id at 211–13. But see National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v Becerra,
138 S Ct 2361, 2371–72 (2018) (imposing limits on the government’s ability to regulate
commercial speech in general and compelled speech in particular).
106 Hunter, 459 F2d at 213–14. On the Mrs. Murphy exception, see 42 USC
§ 3603(b)(1)–(2) (stating that § 3604 does not apply to landlords who own no more than
three single-family homes, or who rent rooms or units in dwellings that may be occupied
by up to four families, provided that the landlords also live in the dwellings).
107 See 42 USC § 3603(b) (“[n]othing in section 3604 of this title (other than
subsection (c)) shall apply” to Mrs. Murphy landlords) (emphasis added). See also Schwemm,
29 Fordham Urban L J at 191–92 (cited in note 14) (noting that, ironically, only honest racists are punished because Mrs. Murphy is still free to discriminate, so long as she does not
cite a race-based reason for refusing to a rent to someone).
108 See Inclusive Communities, 135 S Ct at 2525 (holding that disparate-impact
claims are cognizable under the FHA).
103
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a particular group is preferred or not preferred.109 Effectively, this
means that § 3604(c) is a strict liability statute.110 Most FHA
claims use discriminatory statements as evidence of a defendant’s
illegal motive under § 3604(a) or (b), rather than as the basis for
a standalone claim.111 In fact, plaintiffs sometimes neglect to seek
liability under § 3604(c) at all, even if an advertisement or statement is obviously discriminatory.112
3. The “ordinary reader” standard.
The FHA does not specify how to determine whether an
advertisement is discriminatory.113 Attempting to resolve this
ambiguity, the Fourth Circuit in Hunter introduced the concept
of an “ordinary reader.”114 Specifically, the court considered
whether “the natural interpretation of the advertisements,” to an
ordinary reader, “indicate[s] a racial preference in the acceptance
of tenants.”115 Other appellate courts have subsequently adopted
and expanded upon this approach.116
Most notably, in Ragin v New York Times,117 black prospective homeowners sued The New York Times, alleging that its
housing advertisements featured almost exclusively white models.118 The complaint further alleged that “the few blacks represented are usually depicted as building maintenance employees,
doormen, entertainers, sports figures, small children or cartoon
characters.”119 The Second Circuit denied the newspaper’s motion

109 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 215 (cited in note 14). Compare 42 USC
§ 3604(c), with 42 USC §§ 3604(a)–(b), (d)–(f)(2), 3605, 3606.
110 Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 216 (cited in note 14).
111 Id at 251.
112 Id at 255–60. Professor Schwemm urges fair housing litigators to use the provision
more aggressively, rather than as a backup plan when a Mrs. Murphy exception would
otherwise shield a landlord from liability. Id at 262–63.
113 See Miami Valley Fair Housing Center, Inc v Connor Group, 725 F3d 571, 577 (6th
Cir 2013) (“The Fair Housing Act’s language is purposely broad and ‘the statute and regulations create no fixed and immutable rules to determine whether an advertisement is
discriminatory.’”), quoting Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc v Cincinnati Enquirer,
943 F2d 644, 647 (6th Cir 1991).
114 Hunter, 459 F2d at 215.
115 Id.
116 See, for example, Jancik v Department of Housing and Urban Development, 44 F3d
553, 556 (7th Cir 1995); Ragin v New York Times, 923 F2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir 1991);
Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc, 943 F2d at 646.
117 923 F2d 995 (2d Cir 1991).
118 Id at 998.
119 Id.
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to dismiss, concluding that § 3604(c) is violated “if an ad for housing suggests to an ordinary reader that a particular race is preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question.”120 The discriminatory message need not be as inflammatory as a “swastika or
burning cross,” so long as the ad “would discourage an ordinary
reader of a particular race from answering it.”121 At the same time,
“[t]he ordinary reader is neither the most suspicious nor the most
insensitive of our citizenry.”122 Thus, “[a]n ad depicting a single
model or couple of one race that is run only two or three times
would seem, absent some other direct evidence of an intentional
racial message, outside Section 3604(c)’s prohibitions as a matter
of law.”123
Circuit courts are divided as to whether an advertisement
must discourage an ordinary reader from responding, or if merely
indicating a discriminatory preference is sufficient to violate
§ 3604(c). In the Second and Seventh Circuits, “preference” is read
to “describe any ad that would discourage an ordinary reader of a
particular race from answering it.”124 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected this approach in Miami Valley Fair Housing Center, Inc v Connor Group.125 Instead, the Sixth Circuit analyzes the message alone without considering whether it
discourages a reader from responding to the ad.126 Under the nodiscouragement-required interpretation, anyone who encounters
a discriminatory message may have standing to sue.
The ambiguity surrounding the application of the “ordinary
reader” standard cuts two ways. On the one hand, courts may
struggle to assess the strength of a § 3604(c) claim—an “ordinary
reader” is arguably as nebulous as a “reasonable person.” On the
other hand, as Part III explains, the standard is capacious enough
120

Id at 999 (emphasis added).
Ragin, 923 F2d at 999–1000. See also Jancik, 44 F3d at 556 (“[C]ourts have not
required that ads jump out at the reader with their offending message.”).
122 Ragin, 923 F2d at 1002.
123 Id (emphasis added). See also Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc, 943 F2d at
648 (adopting the “ordinary reader” standard, but concluding that a single ad featuring a
white model, standing alone, would not violate § 3604(c) as a matter of law); Spann v
Colonial Village, Inc, 662 F Supp 541, 546 (DDC 1987) (holding that “absent a showing of
intent to indicate a racial preference or of other extrinsic circumstances revelatory of a
racial preference, real estate advertisements do not violate the [FHA] merely because models of a particular race are not used in one ad or a series of ads”).
124 Ragin, 923 F2d at 999–1000 (emphasis added). See also Jancik, 44 F3d at 556
(adopting the Second Circuit’s approach in Ragin).
125 725 F3d 571 (6th Cir 2013).
126 Id at 577–78 (“We decline to incorporate the discourage language into our
ordinary-reader analysis.”).
121
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to allow for creative arguments in light of the FHA’s legislative
purpose and antisubordination theory.
B. Lack of Regulatory Guidance
Like the text of the statute itself, the relevant subsection of
the Code of Federal Regulations does not provide much clarity regarding the language in which advertisements should appear to
comply with the FHA. 24 CFR § 100.75(b) states that the FHA
applies to “all written or oral notices or statements by a person
engaged in the sale or rental of a dwelling,” indicating that wordof-mouth advertising in Chinese may run afoul of the FHA.127
“Written notices and statements include any applications, flyers,
brochures, deeds, signs, banners, posters, billboards or any documents used with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.”128
Furthermore, “[d]iscriminatory notices, statements and advertisements include, but are not limited to” the following:
(1) Using words, phrases, photographs, illustrations,
symbols or forms which convey that dwellings are
available or not available to a particular group of
persons because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin.
(2) Expressing to agents, brokers, employees, prospective
sellers or renters or any other persons a preference for or
limitation on any purchaser or renter because of race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin of such persons.
(3) Selecting media or locations for advertising the sale or
rental of dwellings which deny particular segments of the
housing market information about housing opportunities
because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin.

127 24 CFR § 100.75(b) (emphasis added). See also Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J
at 214–15 (cited in note 14). For word-of-mouth advertising in the context of employmentdiscrimination claims under Title VII, see, for example, EEOC v Consolidated Service
Systems, 989 F2d 233, 234 (7th Cir 1993).
128 24 CFR § 100.75(b).
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(4) Refusing to publish advertising for the sale or rental of
dwellings or requiring different charges or terms for
such advertising because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin.129
Each of these subsections could present problems for landlords and newspapers that exclusively use Chinese-language advertisements. For example, under subsection (1), a plaintiff might
argue that Chinese characters are “words” or “symbols” conveying
that “dwellings are available” only to persons of Chinese descent.130 Under subsection (2), Chinese-language advertisements
might implicitly “[e]xpress[ ]” a preference for Chinese renters.131
Under subsection (3), a plaintiff could argue that posting fliers in
Chinese around Chinatown “den[ies]” other minority groups the
opportunity to learn about vacancies.132 Finally, under subsection (4), a landlord or publisher might be liable for “[r]efusing” to
publish advertisements in languages other than Chinese.133
Although I have not found cases making these precise claims, the
growth of Chicago’s Chinatown makes such claims more likely in
the future.
HUD has issued guidelines to its regulations indicating that
the language in which advertisements appear may matter in
some circumstances. For example, 24 CFR § 100.75(d) refers advertisers to 24 CFR Part 109, which “describes the matters the
Department will review in evaluating compliance with the Fair
Housing Act and in investigating complaints alleging discriminatory housing practices involving advertising.”134 Specifically, HUD
has stated that “the exclusive use of media catering to the majority
population in an area, when, in such area, there are also available
non-English language or other minority media, may have discriminatory impact.”135 Depending on how a court defines an
“area” and construes the “majority population” in that area,
Chinese-language classifieds might discriminate against people
who are not part of the neighborhood’s Chinese majority. In other
words, the decision to define an area as a particular neighborhood
as opposed to the city at large will likely change the composition
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

24 CFR § 100.75(c) (emphases added).
24 CFR § 100.75(c)(1).
24 CFR § 100.75(c)(2).
24 CFR § 100.75(c)(3).
24 CFR § 100.75(c)(4).
24 CFR § 100.75(d).
Previously codified at 24 CFR § 109.25 (emphases added).
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of the “majority population” in an area, potentially resulting in
§ 3604(c) liability.
Part 109 also indicates that the selective geographic placement of advertising may give rise to liability:
Such selective use may involve the strategic placement of
billboards; brochure advertisements distributed within a limited geographic area by hand or in the mail; advertising in
particular geographic coverage editions of major metropolitan newspapers or in newspapers of limited circulation which
are mainly advertising vehicles for reaching a particular segment of the community; or displays or announcements available only in selected sales offices.136
Under this guidance, Chinese-language newspapers and other
publishing outlets could be at risk of liability.
At least one court has stated that HUD guidelines are entitled to “great weight” when determining whether a § 3604(c)
violation occurred.137 But in Spann v Colonial Village, Inc,138 the
District Court for the District of Columbia determined that although Part 109 gives notice to advertisers about when HUD will
investigate housing complaints, these guidelines were not meant
to apply to litigation in court.139 Moreover, Part 109 was removed
from the CFR in 1996 as part of a regulatory reform initiative.140
In any event, the guidelines are now several decades old, so it is
unclear if HUD would still adhere to them today.141
C. Guidance from Analogous Case Law
Because there have been no cases involving claims that the
exclusive use of Chinese-language advertisements violates

136

Previously codified at 24 CFR § 109.25(a) (emphases added).
See United States v Long, Prentice-Hall Equal Opportunity in Housing Rptr
¶ 13,631, 14,091 (D SC 1974). See also Trafficante, 409 US at 210 (noting that HUD’s
construction of “aggrieved persons” under the FHA “is entitled to great weight”).
138 662 F Supp 541 (DDC 1987), revd on other grounds, 899 F2d 24, 25–26 (DC
Cir 1990).
139 Spann, 622 F Supp at 545.
140 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity,
Regulatory Reinvention, Streamlining of HUD’s Regulations Implementing the Fair
Housing Act, 61 Fed Reg 14378, 14378–80 (1996), amending 24 CFR Parts 100, 103 and
removing 24 CFR Part 109.
141 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity,
Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed Reg 3232, 3308–10
(1989), amending 24 CFR Parts 14, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 115, and 121. See
also Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 220 & n 142 (cited in note 14).
137
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§ 3604(c),142 I have turned to related areas of FHA case law for
guidance. A court faced with such a claim could look to national
origin discrimination cases, racial-steering cases, and humanmodel cases as potential analogues. However, none of these approaches maps neatly onto the context of minority-language housing advertisements.
1. National origin.
FHA cases involving allegations of national origin discrimination are a logical place to start. In Holmgren v Little Village
Community Reporter,143 a Swedish American plaintiff sought to
enjoin three Chicago neighborhood newspapers from publishing
classified advertisements on the basis of national origin discrimination.144 The advertisements expressed a preference for home
buyers and tenants who spoke languages associated with “Polish,
Bohemian, Slavi[c], German, Spanish and American” nationalities.145 The defendants argued that the ability to speak a given
language is not related to national origin, and that speaking a
common language facilitates proper communication between contracting parties.146 The court rejected that argument, observing
that “to say that the ability to speak a certain language is not
related to the country of origin of that language is mere sophistry.”147 Ultimately, the court concluded that “ads which indicate
a preference for a purchaser or a tenant who speaks a particular
language are unlawful under § 3604(c).”148 While this case might
seem to suggest that Chinese-language advertisements inherently violate the FHA, it is distinguishable in that the court was
not considering an ad written in a minority language; rather, the

142 But see Guevara v UMH Properties, Inc, 2014 WL 5488918 *5–6 (WD Tenn) (concluding that Hispanic residents in a mobile home park stated a claim under § 3604(c) when
defendants allegedly discouraged African Americans from applying by advertising exclusively in Spanish).
143 342 F Supp 512 (ND Ill 1971).
144 Id at 513.
145 Id at 513 n 1. The advertisements themselves seem to have appeared in English,
but they specified that prospective buyers and tenants who spoke languages associated
with the enumerated nationalities were preferred.
146 Id at 513.
147 Holmgren, 342 F Supp at 513.
148 Id.
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ad indicated an explicit preference for residents of certain ethnicities.149 Thus, Holmgren does not provide clear guidance for addressing the problem of Chinese-language advertisements.
More recently, in Housing Rights Center v Donald Sterling
Corp,150 a group of African American and African Jamaican tenants sued their landlord, Donald Sterling, for national origin discrimination, alleging that Sterling instructed his staff to rent only
to Korean American tenants because he did not like Hispanic or
black tenants.151 The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant’s advertisements featured a Korean flag, thereby indicating a
preference for Koreans.152 The judge determined that the landlord’s use of a Korean flag in an announcement did not violate the
FHA because an ordinary reader would likely view the flag as
symbolic of the rental company’s name, “American Korean Land
Company.”153 Nonetheless, the court enjoined Sterling from using
the word “Korean” in any of his apartment building names.154 By
enjoining explicit references to national origin in building names
but permitting the use of a national symbol in housing announcements, Donald Sterling Corp suggests that Chinese-language advertisements, as symbols of the existence of a Chinese-language
community, may not violate § 3604(c).
2. Racial steering.
Another potentially useful line of cases concerns advertising
practices found to have a racial steering effect. The defendant in
United States v Real Estate One, Inc155 placed advertisements for
homes in “changing areas” of Detroit in a newspaper with a predominantly African American readership.156 The court noted that
this tactic conflicted with the defendant’s usual practice of placing
advertisements in general circulation newspapers. Accordingly,
the court ordered the defendant to counterbalance its advertising
149 Id at 513 n 1. But see Forrest, Note, 101 Ky L J at 854 (cited in note 17) (citing
Holmgren for the proposition that “language and national origin are correlated closely
enough to make selecting for a foreign language impermissible discrimination”). Forrest
concedes, however, that the case does not resolve the question of whether the language in
which an advertisement is written may implicitly convey a discriminatory message, regardless of the underlying meaning of the text. Id.
150 274 F Supp 2d 1129 (CD Cal 2003).
151 Id at 1134.
152 Id.
153 Id at 1138.
154 Sterling, 274 F Supp 2d at 1138–41.
155 433 F Supp 1140 (ED Mich 1977).
156 Id at 1151.
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in the predominantly black newspaper with advertising of the
same homes in general circulation newspapers.157
At the same time, courts are sympathetic to marketing
campaigns intended to encourage integration. For example, the
Seventh Circuit found no violation of § 3604(a) or (c) in SouthSuburban Housing Center v Greater South Suburban Board of
Realtors,158 when a housing center implemented an affirmative
marketing campaign to attract white residents to Park Forest,
Illinois.159 Crucially, the campaign aimed to correct the racial imbalance that resulted when white flight and a wave of foreclosures
“led to abandoned homes and neighborhood blight.”160 This case
suggests that advertisements which might superficially appear to
run afoul of § 3604(c) may nonetheless be permissible when they
further the broader purposes of the FHA.
3. Human models.
The “human-model cases” of the late 1980s and early 1990s
involved black residents who alleged that real estate advertisements featuring exclusively white models violated § 3604(c).161
The Ragin case, discussed in Part II.A.3, is one such example.162
Not all of these suits were successful, however. In Housing
Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) v Cincinnati Enquirer,163 the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of the defendant
newspaper’s motion to dismiss despite very similar facts to those
in Ragin.164 Like the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit surmised
that a single advertisement featuring exclusively white models
would not likely give rise to liability.165 It differed, however in its
rejection of an aggregate theory of liability based on multiple advertisements, concluding that such a theory stretched the statute
too far.166
157

Id at 1152.
935 F2d 868 (7th Cir 1991).
159 Id at 884–85.
160 Id at 873.
161 See Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J at 222–26 (cited in note 14).
162 See generally Ragin, 923 F2d 995. See also Ragin v Harry Maclowe Real Estate
Co, 801 F Supp 1213, 1232 (SDNY 1992) (holding that a corporate leasing agent and owner
violated § 3604(c) by publishing advertisements for luxury apartments featuring only
white models), affd in relevant part and revd in part on other grounds, Ragin v Harry
Maclowe Real Estate Co, 6 F3d 898, 907, 909, 911 (2d Cir 1993).
163 943 F2d 644 (6th Cir 1991).
164 Id at 645, 654.
165 Id at 648.
166 Id at 653.
158
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Arguably, Chinese characters are the functional equivalent
of white models in that they project implicit messages about the
intended residents of a community. But the allegedly discriminatory message that Chinese-language advertisements send is not
nearly as clear as that of the human-model cases. Moreover, while
minority-language communities generate network effects by
bringing together a critical mass of language speakers and readers, racially discriminatory housing advertisements lack such
benefits.167 This Comment addresses these network effects in
more detail in Part III.B.
D. Theoretical Considerations
As I explained in Part I.B and Parts II.A–C, the typical
sources of guidance for statutory interpretation—text, legislative
history, applicable regulations, and case law—do not conclusively
resolve whether and when minority-language housing advertisements violate the FHA.168 Before proceeding to my proposed solution, it is worth expanding upon the theoretical considerations informing that solution.
First, although language is correlated with national origin, it
is not synonymous with national origin. Obvious examples include Spanish and French, which are spoken in many countries
besides Spain and France, respectively. Additionally, contrary to
popular belief, the United States does not have an official language, at least at the federal level.169 In recent years, some states
have passed laws declaring English the official state language as
part of the “English-Only” movement,170 but neither the FHA nor
its accompanying regulations explicitly mandate that housing
advertisements appear in English.
In comparison to its more well-known provisions, § 3604(c)
has not received much scholarly attention.171 Professor
167

On network effects, see Lemley and McGowan, 86 Cal L Rev at 489 (cited in note 27).
Because I conclude that the text of § 3604(c) is unclear, consideration of alternative sources is (arguably) appropriate under the plain meaning rule. But see William
Baude and Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U Chi L Rev 539, 546–
47 (2017) (questioning why the probative value of nontextual information should depend
on whether the text is clear).
169 Harmeet Kaur, FYI: English Isn’t the Official Language of the United States (CNN,
June 15, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/F27N-TDY9.
170 See Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken
Here, 24 Harv CR–CL L Rev 293, 300 & n 55 (1989).
171 But see, for example, Reginald Leaman Robinson, The Racial Limits of the Fair
Housing Act: The Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity, and the Master Narrative of Black Inferiority, 37 Wm & Mary L Rev 69, 155–59 (1995);
168
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Schwemm’s Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A
New Look at the Fair Housing Act’s Most Intriguing Provision contains an extensive treatment of the section.172 Schwemm surveys
the relevant legislative history and emphasizes that despite its
sparsity, § 3604(c) was intended to apply broadly to further
Congress’s ultimate goal of housing integration.173 Yet he does not
address the question presented in this Comment regarding the
language in which housing advertisements appear.174
My approach, described in Part III, draws significantly upon
antisubordination theory. At its core, antisubordination theory
posits that antidiscrimination law should not make disadvantaged groups worse off.175 The theory intersects with recent debates regarding whether antidiscrimination laws should apply
symmetrically or asymmetrically. Symmetrical laws, like
Title VII, prohibit discrimination on the basis of a protected trait,
such as race.176 Asymmetrical laws, like the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990,177 prohibit discrimination only for a limited class of people, such as the disabled.178 Some scholars have
argued that symmetry may actually further antisubordination
goals,179 while others contend that asymmetrical enforcement of

Debra L. Alligood, Comment, When the Medium Becomes the Message: A Proposal for
Principal Media Liability for the Publication of Racially Exclusionary Real Estate
Advertisements, 40 UCLA L Rev 199, 200 & n 8, 203 (1992).
172 See generally Schwemm, 29 Fordham Urban L J 187 (cited in note 14).
173 Id at 212–13.
174 The only scholarly work addressing this question is a student Note by R. Ian
Forrest. See generally Forrest, Note, 101 Ky L J 839 (cited in note 17). Forrest argues that
language is an element of national origin under the FHA, and therefore “foreign language
advertising” for housing violates § 3604(c). Id at 853. He also argues that under the “ordinary reader” test, an ordinary reader is necessarily a monolingual English speaker. Id at
856. I find this slippage between native language and national origin troubling. Given the
growing linguistic, racial, and cultural diversity of the United States, courts cannot assume that advertisements appearing in languages other than English are per se discriminatory. Moreover, the ordinary reader is not necessarily a monolingual English speaker
as Forrest assumes.
175 See Fiss, 5 Phil & Pub Affairs at 157 (cited in note 25). See also Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination 117
(Yale 1979); David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 S Ct Rev 99, 130–32;
Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 Cal
L Rev 935, 960 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich L Rev 2410,
2429 (1994); Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U Miami L Rev 9, 28 (2003).
176 Schoenbaum, 2017 Wis L Rev at 76 (cited in note 22).
177 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
178 Schoenbaum, 2017 Wis L Rev at 76 (cited in note 22).
179 Id at 86.
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antidiscrimination law is justified in some circumstances.180 Without taking sides in the debate over which regime is more effective
or normatively desirable, I argue that courts should interpret the
FHA as calling for not only housing integration, but also the
breakdown of social hierarchies among races and nationalities.
III. APPLYING ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY TO THE FHA
This Part outlines an approach in which the exclusive use of
minority-language housing advertisements does not necessarily
violate the FHA. Continuing to use Chicago’s Chinatown as a case
study, Part III.A proposes a series of nonexhaustive factors that
a court should consider when faced with a Chinese- or other
minority-language housing advertisement. Even if an advertisement is found to violate § 3604(c), courts should exercise discretion in their damage awards, with an emphasis on the degree of
harm caused, so as not to drive Chinese landlords and newspapers out of the market entirely.
In Part III.B, I take a broader view and consider whether
courts and policymakers should reassess the FHA’s goal of promoting housing integration at the expense of other values. Drawing upon antisubordination theory, I conclude that the § 3604(c)
should be construed narrowly to protect minority rights rather
than mandating integration at all costs. This approach will preserve the network effects that minority-language communities
generate and ensure that the FHA does not further disadvantage
historically marginalized communities.
A. Factors to Guide Judicial Decision-Making
There are many factors that a court might weigh when confronted with a minority-language housing advertisement, but this
Section advocates that they focus on the following: (1) the
demographics of the relevant community, (2) the identities and
language capabilities of the plaintiff(s) and defendant(s), (3) the
content of the advertisement itself, and (4) the costs of translation. These factors emerge from HUD’s guidance on § 3604(c) in
24 CFR Part 109, the “ordinary reader” standard, and practical
considerations in analogous Title VII cases.

180

Areheart, 58 BC L Rev at 1123–29 (cited in note 22).
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1. Demographics of the relevant community.
First, the demographics of the community where an advertisement appears should inform a court’s application of the “ordinary reader” standard for § 3604(c) liability. HUD’s Part 109 suggests that “the use of English language media alone or the
exclusive use of media catering to the majority population in an
area, when, in such area, there are also available non-English
language or other minority media, may have discriminatory impact.”181 Assuming that Part 109 is still good guidance, it is unclear how large an “area” should be. An “area” could hypothetically include all of Chicago, all of Chinatown, or just the block
where a dwelling is located.182 And even if a court would decline
to rely upon Part 109 as guidance, it is still persuasive authority
due to the dearth of alternative sources.
Borrowing from antitrust law, I propose defining the relevant
community before engaging in § 3604(c) analysis of minoritylanguage housing advertisements.183 In merger challenges under
the antitrust laws, courts first define the relevant geographic
market to determine if the proposed merger would harm competition in that market.184 Similarly, courts should determine the
scope of a housing area before analyzing how an ordinary reader
in that community would perceive an advertisement. Given that
housing markets are inherently local and tied to metropolitan areas, a national scale would be far too large. Instead, courts should
apply HUD’s definition of “geographic area” in its Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) rule.185 HUD defines geographic
area as “a jurisdiction, region, State, Core-Based Statistical Area
(CBSA), or another applicable area (e.g., census tract, neighborhood, Zip code, block group, housing development, or portion
thereof).”186 This definition would provide courts with flexibility
to define the relevant community in light of local conditions.
For instance, in Chicago’s Chinatown, a court might look to a
map of Chicago’s seventy-seven community areas as a starting

181

Previously codified at 24 CFR § 109.25 (emphases added). See Part II.B.
See Part II.B.
183 See Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States, 370 US 294, 336–37 (1962) (“[A]lthough
the geographic market in some instances may encompass the entire Nation, under other
circumstances it may be as small as a single metropolitan area.”).
184 See US Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines § 4.2 (2010) (explaining how the agencies define a geographic market).
185 See Part I.B.
186 24 CFR § 5.152.
182
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point.187 Curiously, however, “Chinatown” is not an officially designated community area; rather, it occupies portions of the areas
labeled Armour Square and Bridgeport, demonstrating that municipal designations are imperfect representations of neighborhood identity.188 Alternatively, a court could draw upon the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hills v Gautreaux,189 which suggests that the relevant community will often extend beyond the
city limits to an entire metropolitan area.190 At minimum, historical research on Chicago’s Chinatown indicates that the relevant
community should include the area north of the Stevenson highway, east of the Chicago river, and west of Clark Street, creating
a rough triangle on the city’s near southwest side.191
Once a court has defined the relevant area, it should then examine census data regarding the percentage of residents in the
relevant community that speak or read languages other than
Chinese, and if so, what languages.192 The Eastern District of
Michigan’s decision in Real Estate One lends support for this approach. In that case, the court analyzed patterns of racial change
in Detroit before ordering a remedy to combat the defendant’s racially discriminatory advertising practices.193 Courts could also
consider what percentage (if any) of affordable housing is excluded
from non-Chinese prospective residents through the exclusive use

187

See, for example, Chicago Neighborhoods (cited in note 31).
See Ling, Chinese Chicago at 55 (cited in note 32) (identifying areas 34 and 60 as
Armour Square and Bridgeport, respectively). For more detailed maps, see Armour Square
(City of Chicago, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/3MJ2-QYCN; Bridgeport (City of
Chicago, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/B73H-MBZE.
Chicagoans themselves disagree over the proper boundaries between neighborhoods.
See, for example, Tanveer Ali, This Is Where Chicagoans Say the Borders of Their Neighborhoods Are (DNAinfo, Sept 28, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/FZP2-BBN3 (illustrating how Chicagoans draw the boundaries of various neighborhoods, but not depicting
Chinatown).
189 425 US 284 (1976).
190 Id at 299 (concluding, in a case alleging racial discrimination in public housing,
that “[t]he relevant geographic area for purposes of the respondents’ housing options is
the Chicago housing market, not the Chicago city limits”). Gautreaux is arguably distinguishable, however, in that it involved public housing, rather than private landlords or
publishers.
191 See, for example, Ling, Chinese Chicago at 52 (cited in note 32). See also id at
216–17.
192 See, for example, Ryan, Language Use in the United States *2 (cited in note 10)
(noting that US Census data from the American Community Survey “provides reliable
estimates for small levels of geography, including counties, cities, and tracts, allowing exploration of the distribution of language use across states and metropolitan areas of the
United States”).
193 Real Estate One, 433 F Supp at 1145–46. See Part II.C.2.
188
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of Chinese-language advertisements, and what percentage of that
excluded population consists of racial or ethnic minorities.194 These
statistics will help determine the degree of harm caused by denying non-Chinese residents easy access to listings in Chinatown.
2. The identities and language capabilities of the parties.
In order to determine if a plaintiff actually suffered psychic
harm from an allegedly discriminatory advertisement, a court can
and should consider the identities of the parties.195 Specifically, a
court should examine the race, national origin, and language abilities of the plaintiff and defendant.
For example, in Chicago’s Chinatown, if a Chinese landlord
or publisher can speak or write in another language, that may
counsel in favor of liability because the landlord or publisher
could have easily provided a parallel translation. If a landlord or
publisher cannot speak or write in another language, liability is
probably not called for, as it would seem inconsistent with the
antisubordination goals underlying the FHA to impose a duty on
immigrants to advertise in languages they do not know.196
Next, courts should consider whether the plaintiff can read
or speak a language other than Chinese. If the plaintiff can in fact
read Chinese and understands the advertisement, the harm from
reading it might seem insignificant at first glance. But such a
reader could argue that the exclusive use of Chinese-language
housing advertisements denied her the ability to live in an integrated community.197 If the plaintiff cannot understand Chinese,
that would tip the scale in favor of liability, assuming that the
plaintiff interpreted the advertisement as a signal that he or she
is unwelcome in the community. Proponents of a “colorblind” approach to antidiscrimination law might object that the identities
194 See, for example, Gautreaux, 425 US at 288 (citing evidence that “the public housing system [in Chicago] was racially segregated, with four overwhelmingly white projects
located in white neighborhoods and with 99½% of the remaining family units located in
Negro neighborhoods”).
195 Title VII case law also considers the parties’ identities. Under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit
must first establish “that he belongs to a racial minority.” McDonnell Douglas Corp v
Green, 411 US 792, 802 (1973).
196 See EEOC v Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d 233, 237–38 (7th Cir 1993)
(suggesting that imposing additional burdens on minority businesses may run counter to
Title VII’s goal of increasing economic opportunity to minorities).
197 See Trafficante, 409 US at 212 (holding that white residents had standing to
sue their landlord for depriving them of the opportunity to live in a racially integrated
community).

254

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:223

of the parties should be irrelevant, but this information is crucial
for judges to calculate damage awards if liability is ultimately
established.198
3. Content of the advertisement itself.
Having defined the relevant community and considered the
language capabilities and identities of the parties, courts should
then consider the content of the advertisement or advertisements
in question. As discussed in Part II.C.3, § 3604(c) liability is unlikely to arise from a single advertisement, at least in the context
of human models.199 By contrast, a plaintiff may have a stronger
claim when an advertisement is viewed alongside a series of advertisements.200 The inquiry then becomes whether a minoritylanguage advertising campaign conveys a discriminatory preference to an ordinary reader.
Courts should not rush to the conclusion that an ordinary
reader is a monolingual English speaker.201 Rather, an ordinary
reader is a person who lives in the relevant community.202 Such a
reader might only read Chinese, but she might also read Spanish,
English, or some other language, depending on how the community is defined. Complicating matters further, there is significant
variation within the broader Chinese community. Mandarin
Chinese speakers are more likely to read simplified Chinese,
while Taiwanese and Cantonese speakers are more likely to read
traditional Chinese characters.203
Admittedly, it is cold comfort that non-Chinese readers do not
know what they are missing if they encounter a Chinese housing
advertisement and cannot understand it. Facebook recently found
itself in hot water when ProPublica revealed that the social networking site allows housing advertisers to target their ads by

198 Notable advocates of colorblindness in antidiscrimination law include Alexander
M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 (Yale 1975) (condemning the use of racial quotas
“in a society desperately striving for an equality that will make race irrelevant”) and
William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 Yale
L J 995, 1000, 1003–05 (1984) (arguing against the use of racial preferences to correct
imbalances).
199 See, for example, Housing Opportunities Made Equal, 943 F2d at 648 (concluding
that a single ad featuring a white model, standing alone, would not violate § 3604(c) as a
matter of law).
200 See Ragin, 923 F2d at 1002.
201 My approach contrasts with Forrest, Note, 101 Ky L J at 856 (cited in note 17).
202 On the “ordinary reader” standard, see Part II.A.3.
203 See Forrest, Note, 101 Ky L J at 856 n 91 (cited in note 17).
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race.204 Similarly, the cumulative effect of an absence of advertisements in languages other than Chinese could still convey a message that non-Chinese residents are not welcome. Yet again, the
key question for § 3604(c) analysis is whether an ordinary reader
in the relevant community would interpret the advertising campaign as indicating a discriminatory preference on the basis of
race or national origin.
4. Translation costs.
With the rise of Google Translate and other translation software, the costs associated with translating an advertisement are
decreasing. Nonetheless, on balance, landlords should bear the
costs of translation. Landlords presumably have greater access to
economic and social capital than recent immigrants, and thus can
more readily provide translations upon request. At the same time,
courts should be wary of imposing too high a burden (in terms of
liability or increased costs) on minority-language newspapers,
such as The Chicago Chinese Times.205 The Ragin court recognized
this danger:
[T]he [New York] Times is fearful that such claims from a
multitude of plaintiffs might lead to a large number of staggering, perhaps crushing, damage awards that might over
time impair the press’s role in society. . . . The potential for
large numbers of truly baseless claims for emotional injury
[ ] exists, and there appears to be no ready device, other than
wholly speculative judgments as to credibility, to separate
the genuine from the baseless.206
The court was careful to note, however, that publishers should
not be immunized from liability merely because they might go out
of business. Instead, the court emphasized the importance of
“assert[ing] judicial control over the size of damage awards for
emotional injury in individual cases.”207

204 Julia Angwin and Terry Parris Jr, Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by
Race (ProPublica, Oct 28, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/7F9H-LWDG; Julia Angwin,
Ariana Tobin, and Madeleine Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude Users by Race (ProPublica, Nov 21, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/SPQ5-BANE.
205 See generally 芝加哥時報 (The Chicago Chinese Times), online at https://
chicagochinesetimes.com (visited Aug 19, 2019). As of this writing, Google Chrome can
translate the text of the webpage, but not the surrounding advertisements.
206 Ragin, 923 F2d at 1004–05.
207 Id.
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Similarly, in EEOC v Consolidated Service Systems,208 the
Seventh Circuit held that a small business’s use of word-of-mouth
hiring, which resulted in an overwhelmingly Korean workforce,
did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.209 The company’s
owner purchased three newspaper advertisements, two in a general circulation newspaper and one in a Korean-language newspaper, but those advertisements resulted in no hires, and the wordof-mouth system was much cheaper.210 Judge Richard Posner
observed that “[i]t would be a bitter irony if the federal agency
dedicated to enforcing the antidiscrimination laws succeeded in
using those laws to kick these people off the ladder by compelling
them to institute costly systems of hiring.”211 Moreover, “[t]he fact
that [job applicants] are ethnically or racially uniform does not
impose upon [a hiring manager] a duty to spend money advertising in the help-wanted columns of the Chicago Tribune.”212 Thus,
the foregoing analysis should not impose a duty upon landlords and
publishers to create advertisements in every conceivable language.
Instead, courts should interpret § 3604(c) such that publishing an advertisement exclusively in Chinese would not weigh in
favor of liability unless the landlord or publisher refused to provide a translation upon request and had the ability to do so. Recall that there is no Mrs. Murphy exception to § 3604(c),213 so
courts should consider a landlord’s sophistication or lack thereof
before assigning responsibility for translation costs. If a landlord
or publisher has the ability to translate an advertisement but is
reluctant to accept applications from tenants lacking Chineselanguage skills, that would weigh in favor of finding that Chineseonly advertisements violate § 3604(c). This approach balances
the FHA’s goal of expanding access to housing while permitting
landlords and publishers to signal that Chinatown is a Chineselanguage community.
B. Network Effects and Language Communities
Although my proposed solution stipulates that Chineselanguage advertisements do not necessarily violate the FHA,
many such advertisements may nonetheless be subject to
208
209
210
211
212
213

989 F2d 233 (7th Cir 1993).
Id at 236.
Id at 235.
Id at 238.
Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d at 237.
See 42 USC § 3603(b)(1)–(2). See also note 107 and accompanying text.
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§ 3604(c) liability. From an antisubordination perspective, this
result seems troubling, in that it exacerbates rather than combats
the subordinate position of a disadvantaged group—in this case,
Chinese immigrants. Thus, it may be time to rethink courts’ tendency to interpret the FHA as privileging housing integration at
the expense of competing values.
Ethnic enclaves generate network effects by attracting a critical mass of minority-language speakers and readers to a community. Yet overzealous “colorblind” enforcement of § 3604(c) against
minority-language advertisements would negate these effects and
run counter to the antisubordination promise of the FHA. To the
extent that the text of the FHA conflicts with this interpretation,
I urge policymakers to consider amending § 3604(c) to make clear
that minority-language housing advertisements do not violate the
FHA absent evidence of discriminatory intent. In other words, the
creators of such advertisements should not be liable unless extrinsic evidence suggests that they intended to discriminate against
prospective residents who cannot understand their language.
Even without amending the FHA, this interpretation is consistent
with § 3604(c)’s prohibition on making, printing, or publishing advertisements with “an intention to make [a discriminatory] preference, limitation, or discrimination.”214
1. The benefits of residential homogeneity.
Proponents of critical legal studies and critical race theory
have cast doubt on the notion that integration always redounds
to the benefit of marginalized communities. A significant body of
work criticizes the Brown v Board of Education215 decision for failing to improve the educational outcomes of black students,216 and
for causing negative externalities, such as lost job opportunities
for black teachers.217 Admittedly, these concerns were not at the
forefront of Congress’s discussions when it passed the FHA.218 But
given what we know today about the costs and limitations of

214

42 USC § 3604(c).
347 US 483 (1954).
216 See, for example, Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education
and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform 180–81, 196–98 (Oxford 2004); Gerald
N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 40 (Chicago
2d ed 2008).
217 See Adam Fairclough, The Costs of Brown: Black Teachers and School Integration,
91 J Am Hist 43, 46–47 (2004).
218 See Part I.B.1.
215
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integration to achieve racial justice, courts should avoid rigid applications of the FHA against the very communities it was intended to protect in the first place.219
Some forms of residential homogeneity are designed to exclude marginalized groups. Professor Lior Strahilevitz has argued
that many residential communities use “exclusionary amenities,”
such as golf courses, to achieve racial homogeneity in spite of the
FHA.220 Because playing golf is a close proxy for whiteness, charging a premium to live near a golf course tends to exclude black
residents from a community.221 “Exclusionary vibes,” ranging
from architectural styles to condominium names, also act as
signaling devices for who is welcome in the community.222
Strahilevitz is careful to note, however, that exclusionary amenities are not inherently bad: “Where a religious, linguistic, or other
minority community genuinely requires some measure of critical
mass to thrive, it may be appropriate for the state to subsidize the
creation of exclusionary amenities or, failing that, at least to remain neutral.”223 For example, the deaf community in Laurent,
South Dakota, may even generate positive externalities:
There are strong welfarist arguments for such a residential
arrangement, given the network effects and economies of
scale associated with bringing speakers of [sign] language together in one place. There are sound political representation
arguments as well, and Laurent organizers are particularly
enticed by the prospect of electing representatives who will
be forceful advocates for their interests.224
Courts and policymakers should consider the benefits of bringing
together a community of Chinese-language speakers, not only for
network effects and political representation, but also for the inherent benefits of preserving an inclusive space for recent immigrants and Chinese Americans.225
219 But see Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration 112–17 (Princeton
2010) (arguing in favor of racial integration to rectify injustice and inequality).
220 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities,
92 Va L Rev 437, 447, 464 (2006).
221 See id at 464–68.
222 On “exclusionary vibes” in real estate advertising, see Strahilevitz, 104 Mich L
Rev at 1850–55 (cited in note 6).
223 Strahilevitz, 92 Va L Rev at 498 (cited in note 220).
224 Id at 497.
225 See, for example, Ling, Chinese Chicago at 218–20 (cited in note 32) (describing
Chinatown’s numerous community organizations, businesses, and cultural centers for
Chinese immigrants and current residents).
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At first blush, an interpretation of the FHA that acknowledges residential homogeneity as desirable in some communities
might seem counterintuitive.226 I am not aligning myself with
those who say that segregation is entirely voluntary and therefore
integration is not a policy priority or a social good.227 My approach
is not intended to give “white ethnic” communities a playbook to
discriminate against black or Hispanic communities. Rather, the
goal is to challenge judges and policymakers to think beyond the
black/white racial dichotomy that framed the debate when the
FHA was enacted.228
2. The perils of “colorblind” enforcement.
An antisubordinationist interpretation of the FHA would also
prevent the paradoxical enforcement of § 3604(c) in ways that
mandate assimilation (and hasten gentrification) by assuming
that native English speakers are the default ordinary reader. 229
If an ordinary reader only reads English, non-English advertisements would be at greater risk of liability, even though such
advertisements themselves expand access to housing for nonEnglish speakers. Historically, American jurisprudence has “encode[d] or protect[ed] a default ‘white’ normative perspective,
making whites’ interests seem invisible or natural.”230 Yet
Chinese landlords may not be able to speak or write languages
other than Chinese. In this sense, housing is distinct from the
employment context, in which some jobs reasonably require that
an employee can speak English.231 The harms suffered from
exclusionary advertisements will almost certainly be greater for
226

Strahilevitz, 92 Va L Rev at 497–98 (cited in note 220).
See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws 41–42 (1992).
228 See note 49 and accompanying text.
229 For a similar critique of colorblind constitutionalism, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique
of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 Stan L Rev 1, 56 (1991) (“In [a colorblind] society
race would cease to be a matter of substantive interest. The assimilationist ideal holds
that sometime in the future the physical features associated with race—skin color, hair
texture, facial features—would be socially insignificant.”) (citations omitted).
230 Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 Cal L Rev 1497, 1511 (2010).
231 See James Leonard, Title VII and the Protection of Minority Languages in the
American Workplace: The Search for a Justification, 72 Mo L Rev 745, 756–58 (2007) (arguing that language, unlike race or gender, is relevant to job performance in most industries). See also Office of General Counsel Guidance on Fair Housing Act Protections for
Persons with Limited English Proficiency *5 (HUD, Sept 15, 2016), archived at
https://perma.cc/VS3K-RHCE (“[M]any of the interests asserted by employers that some
courts have recognized as non-pretextual under Title VII will be inapplicable with regards
to housing.”).
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historically disadvantaged groups than for whites, and it seems
unjust to impose a de facto duty that landlords who are immigrants themselves must speak and write in English.
Critics may object that my approach will lead to underenforcement of the FHA against Chinese landlords. If Chinese landlords or newspapers are not liable for the exclusive use of Chinese
in housing advertisements, the argument would go, it will be
harder for individuals and enforcement authorities to detect advertisements that substantively discriminate in violation of
§ 3604(c). This fear is not unwarranted. For example, some
Chinese-language advertisements in San Francisco’s Chinatown
have indicated prohibited preferences on the basis of sex, marital
status, and familial status, including blatantly discriminatory
warnings, such as, “if you have children don’t bother asking.”232
Underenforcement of the FHA is unlikely if, as suggested
above, plaintiffs can state a claim under § 3604(c) when a landlord refuses to provide a translation but has the means to do so.
In that case, the prospect of § 3604(c) liability should deter landlords from putting discriminatory messages in Chinese-language
advertisements in the first place. Extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent to exclude non-Chinese minorities could also bolster
a claim that an advertisement indicates a discriminatory preference on the basis of race or national origin.233 This difficult balancing act underscores the need for fact-specific, thoughtful application of § 3604(c).
Enforcement agencies also have an important role to play.
Simply put, HUD and DOJ should not make civil actions against
Chinese landlords and publishers a top priority. Absent evidence
of a widespread “pattern or practice” of discrimination against
non-Chinese prospective residents,234 federal, state, and local
agencies should concentrate their efforts on blatantly discriminatory notices, statements, and advertisements, particularly those
that seek to maintain all-white neighborhoods. HUD has limited
resources for secretary-initiated complaints and should focus its
efforts accordingly.235 State and local housing authorities should
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adopt a similar approach.236 However, because the FHA depends
heavily on private attorneys general,237 the recommendations in
this Part have focused on how courts should interpret the law, not
which cases the government should bring.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has proposed a novel solution to the uncertain
legality of minority-language housing advertisements. Using
Chicago’s Chinatown as a case study, I argue that such advertisements do not violate the FHA unless a series of factors suggests
that they indicate a discriminatory preference. Specifically,
courts should consider the demographics of the relevant community, the identities and language abilities of the parties, the content of the advertisement itself, and the cost of translation. Evidence of discriminatory intent should weigh heavily in favor of
finding that an advertisement or series of advertisements violates
§ 3604(c), but courts should otherwise hesitate before imposing
liability. This solution flows from an appreciation of the antisubordination goals underlying the FHA, as well as the substantial
network effects that minority-language communities generate.
My ultimate goal is to balance the benefits of pro-Chinese
inclusion against the potential for non-Chinese exclusion from
Chinatown. Section 3604(c) is an important tool in the fight
against housing discrimination, but courts and enforcement
agencies should recognize the limitations of this provision to force
integration.
Although this Comment has focused on Chicago’s Chinatown,
the analysis has obvious applications to other ethnic enclaves. For
example, my approach could extend to Chicago’s predominantly
Hispanic Little Village neighborhood or to Little Saigon in
Orange County, California. Further research into the pervasiveness of non-English housing advertisements in these and other
neighborhoods is necessary.
This Comment also has implications for antidiscrimination
law more broadly. It raises difficult questions surrounding the
role of ethnic enclaves in the wake of the FHA and the extent to
which advertisements may signal preferences for target audiences. My solution is informed by antisubordination theory, but I
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recognize the value of symmetrical enforcement of antidiscrimination law to further antisubordination goals.238 This Comment
also urges courts to consider the substantial network effects that
minority-language communities like Chinatown generate. Going
forward, policymakers should consider how best to ensure that
ethnic enclaves are not only welfare-enhancing, but also compatible with a pluralist society.239
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